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Abstract
A defining feature of human culture is that knowledge and technology
continually improve over time. Such cumulative cultural evolution (CCE)
probably depends far more heavily on how reliably information is pre-
served than on how efficiently it is refined. Therefore, one possible reason
that CCE appears diminished or absent in other species is that it re-
quires accurate but specialized forms of social learning at which humans
are uniquely adept. Here, we develop a Bayesian model to contrast the
evolution of high-fidelity social learning, which supports CCE, against
low-fidelity social learning, which does not. We find that high-fidelity
transmission evolves when (1) social and (2) individual learning are inex-
pensive, (3) traits are complex, (4) individual learning is abundant, (5)
adaptive problems are difficult and (6) behaviour is flexible. Low-fidelity
transmission differs in many respects. It not only evolves when (2) indi-
vidual learning is costly and (4) infrequent but also proves more robust
when (3) traits are simple and (5) adaptive problems are easy. If condi-
tions favouring the evolution of high-fidelity transmission are stricter (3
and 5) or harder to meet (2 and 4), this could explain why social learning
is common, but CCE is rare.
1 Introduction
Humanity’s unparalleled cultural and technological sophistication has been widely
attributed to our ability to not just share information, but continually build
upon it as well [1, 2]. This process, called cumulative cultural evolution (CCE),
has resulted in knowledge and technology that no single generation could pro-
duce on its own. However, despite extensive evidence of culture in a wide range
of species [3], non-human animals have demonstrated only a limited capacity for
CCE. Not only has observational evidence proved scarce and contentious [4], but
experiments have shown that CCE can be surprisingly difficult to evoke even
in closely related primates [5, 6]. While some examples have been elicited in
various species [7], these often involve extensive human intervention and remain
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comparatively modest. This raises a question that has perplexed biologists,
psychologists and anthropologists alike: what makes humans, if not unique in
our capacity for CCE, uniquely adept at producing it?
CCE arises when social learning preserves information between generations,
allowing individual learning or lucky errors in transmission to refine it [8]. This
process probably depends far more heavily on how reliably information is pre-
served than on how efficiently it is refined, because the more knowledge accu-
mulates, the more there is to rediscover or reinvent when transmission fails.
Theoretical models explicitly support this idea [9] and often find that transmis-
sion fidelity must pass a threshold for culture to accumulate [10] (though see
cultural attractor theory [11] for an alternative view). Notably, humans transmit
information with exceptionally high fidelity by not only communicating through
language, but also imitating more accurately [6] and robustly [12], leveraging
a more sophisticated theory of mind [13], showing natural inclinations toward
pedagogy [14] and practicing a far wider range of teaching behaviours [15]. This
has led to the view that CCE relies on accurate but specialized forms of social
learning at which humans are particularly adept [16, 17, 2].
Precisely what social learning mechanisms underlie CCE remains unclear,
however. Researchers have long emphasized the role of imitation (process-
copying) and teaching, drawing sharp contrasts with less accurate forms of so-
cial learning like emulation (product-copying) [16, 2, 17]. On this front, trans-
mission chain and laboratory microsociety studies have yielded contradictory
results. Some have found that imitation and emulation both support CCE [18–
20], while others suggest that emulation is insufficient [21, 22]. To complicate
matters further, studies emphasizing ecological validity have found that even im-
itation fails to preserve early stone tool manufacturing (knapping) techniques.
Teaching through gesture [23] or even language [24] may thus be critical to
human-like CCE.
Given this empirical ambiguity, it may be useful to draw a functional dis-
tinction between high-fidelity social learning that supports CCE and low-fidelity
social learning that does not, regardless of what the underlying mechanisms turn
out to be. Bayesian models drawn from work on language evolution have shown
how this can be achieved [25, 26]. These reveal that when social learning is
captured as sampling and inference, it is too low-fidelity for knowledge to accu-
mulate [25]. However, when social learning is captured as the direct transmission
of beliefs [25] or information about those beliefs [26], it can give rise to CCE.
A Bayesian framework thus delineates between these two types of learning in a
mechanism-agnostic way.
Thus far, such models have largely been used to study cultural evolution
in transmission chains. However, they also present an opportunity to address
a more fundamental question: why would biological evolution produce high-
fidelity social learning in some species and not others? Early models showed
that CCE cannot explain the evolution of accurate transmission, because CCE
would take many generations to pay for this upfront investment [16]. As a
result, much of the CCE literature has taken such transmission for granted
and focused on other factors instead, such as demography, social connectedness,
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transmission biases and filtering of maladaptive traits [7]. Here, we develop
a Bayesian model that contrasts the evolution of high- and low-fidelity social
learning directly. Doing so reveals that high-fidelity transmission evolves under
different conditions than social learning that spreads culture but does not refine
it.
2 Model
Consider a population facing an adaptive problem that involves estimating a
set of parameters, Θ = {θ1, θ2, ..., θx}, where each θ takes some value between 0
and 1. Beliefs about each θ are encoded as a probability distribution, p(θ), that
describes which values an individual deems likely and which it does not. For
example, if Θ encapsulates knowledge about constructing a spear, then elements
θ1, θ2 and θ3 could represent the spear’s ideal length, diameter and center of
gravity (where each characteristic is normalized to fall between some minimum
plausible value, represented by θ = 0, and some maximum plausible value,
represented by θ = 1). Similarly, Θ could encode knowledge about knapping,
where θ1 through θx represent the ideal striking platform angle, flaking surface
concavity, distance from the edge, amount of force to apply, etc. Alternatively,
Θ could capture how much time and effort to devote to one food patch (θ1) as
opposed to another (θ2) and thus encode a foraging strategy.
Learning occurs when beliefs, p(θ), change in response to new data, d, result-
ing in an updated set of beliefs, p(θ|d). This is modelled as Bayesian inference,
p(θ|d) = P (d|θ)p(θ)∫ 1
0
P (d|θ)p(θ)dθ
, (2.1)
where posterior beliefs, p(θ|d), are a product of prior beliefs, p(θ), and the like-
lihood of observing the data if those priors are true, P (d|θ). Bayesian inference
thus takes a learner’s beliefs and updates them with new data, such that sur-
prising data change beliefs to a greater extent. The denominator is simply a
normalizing term, which ensures that probabilities integrate to 1.
Beliefs about each θ follow a beta distribution and data, d, consist of either n
samples drawn from the environment or m samples drawn from the population.
After learning, individuals select the most plausible value of θ as their estimate.
This is the posterior distribution’s mode,
θˆMAP = arg max
θ
p(θ|d), (2.2)
which can be calculated directly from a beta distribution’s shape parameters:
θˆ = (α− 1)/(α+ β − 2). This makes our model analytically tractable, because
it allows us to reason in terms of the data individuals observe rather than the
resulting distributions.
Taken together, these estimates shape the individual’s trait. This trait’s
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efficiency is defined by
z = x−
x∑
i=1
∣∣∣θi − θˆi∣∣∣ , (2.3)
where Θˆ = {θˆ1, θˆ2, ..., θˆx} are the individual’s estimates after learning and x is
the trait’s complexity (the set’s cardinality). When estimates lie close to their
ideal values, absolute error is minimized and trait efficiency approaches z = x.
Conversely, when estimates lie far from their ideal values, error is maximized
and trait efficiency is low (z = 0 in the extreme case where each θ and θˆ take
opposite values of 0 and 1).
This formulation makes several simplifying assumptions. First, a trait’s
maximum efficiency grows linearly with trait complexity (x). We will see later
that this assumption can be weakened to include other growth rates (e.g. log-
arithmic), subject to some constraints. Second, each trait has a single optimal
variant (a unimodal adaptive landscape), which is not necessarily true in com-
plex domains like tools [27]. Third, each parameter is independent, with the
ideal value of one θ having no effect on the ideal value of others. In reality, such
contingencies do occur, for example, in knapping [28].
In our model, priors reflect common intuitions about θ, whose influence di-
minishes with learning. These may arise through similarities in genes, ontogeny,
previous experience, etc. For example, if individuals share only weak intuitions
about the ideal length of a spear, some novices could make long spears while oth-
ers make short ones. Alternatively, if individuals share strong biases about the
amount of force to apply when knapping, novices could consistently overestimate
this parameter. In fact, such a pattern has been observed in experiments [28].
We use an asterisk to denote prior estimates, θˆ∗, and trait efficiency, z∗.
An adaptive problem’s difficulty can be defined as the average distance be-
tween a parameter’s ideal value and the prior estimate, f = 1x
∑x
i=1
∣∣θi − θˆ∗i ∣∣.
When problems are hard, the optimal trait is unintuitive and a lot of learning
is needed. Conversely, when problems are easy, efficient solutions are obvi-
ous, and there is little or nothing to learn. This could be due to luck, shared
relevant experience or even because evolution has yielded an innate adaptive
behaviour [29].
2.1 Individual learning
Individual learning involves interacting directly with the environment, through
observation, exploration or trial-and-error. We formalize this as sampling a
random variable X, where E[X] = θ. For example, in foraging, a sample could
indicate whether a given food patch was productive or unproductive, such that
X ∼ Bernoulli(θ). Alternatively, in knapping, a sample could indicate the
distance from the platform edge that produced a viable flake. Distances closer
to the ideal could be more likely to succeed, such that X ∼ N (θ, σ2). Let n be
the average number of samples per parameter. The average individual learner’s
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estimate is thus
¯ˆ
θI =
θn+ θˆ∗v
n+ v
, (2.4)
which reflects the combined influence of the environment (θ) and the prior (θˆ∗).
Note that the relative weight placed on the prior, v > 0, can be understood as
the number of ‘virtual samples’ that would be needed to form that distribution.
Because more genuine samples are needed to overcome stronger priors, v serves
as a measure of conservatism.
Each sample comes at some cost, c ≥ 0, which represents time, energy,
opportunity cost, risk of injury or predation, etc. More sampling yields a more
efficient trait, but comes at a greater overall cost, cnx. For example, making
three spears gives more insight into the ideal length of a spear than making
two would, but requires additional time, effort, material and risk. The average
individual learner’s fitness is thus
ω¯I = ω0 + z¯I − cnx, (2.5)
where ω0 represents aspects of fitness unrelated to learning.
In Bayesian inference, each sample improves accuracy less than the preceding
one. Because the per-sample cost (c) is invariant, this captures the notion
of diminishing returns. The optimal learning rate, which maximizes expected
utility and fitness, is
n =
√
fv
c
− v. (2.6)
Intuitively, individuals learn more when doing so is inexpensive (low c) and
problems are difficult (high f). Conservatism (v) has a more complicated effect.
When individuals are highly conservative, it’s not worth collecting many sam-
ples, because beliefs barely change with new data. Likewise, when priors are
extremely diffuse, few samples are needed to sway the learner. Sampling peaks
when behaviour is flexible and priors are weak, but not so weak that individuals
show no skepticism toward surprising data.
Combining equations (2.3), (2.4) and (2.6) gives the average individual
learner’s trait efficiency:
z¯I = x(1−
√
cfv). (2.7)
Because v > 0, individual learning cannot reliably acquire the optimal trait,
z¯I = x, unless learning is free (c = 0) or the initial trait is already optimal
(f = 0). If learning is costly and difficult, then individual learning only partially
improves the trait and CCE is needed to reliably acquire the ideal variant.
2.2 Low-fidelity social learning
In low-fidelity social learning, individuals learn about the environment by ob-
serving others’ behavioural outcomes. For example, seeing many long spears
but few short ones is indirect evidence that longer spears are more effective.
In reality, behavioural outcomes often fail to accurately reflect beliefs, resulting
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in incomplete information and errors in inference [30]. To capture this notion,
learners do not sample an estimate directly, but rather a random variable Y ,
where E[Y ] = θˆ. For instance, if a demonstrator tries to build spears of length
θˆ, errors in production may result in some shorter and some longer ones, such
that Y ∼ N (θˆ, σ2). Let m be the average number of samples per parameter.
The average low-fidelity social learner’s estimate is thus
¯ˆ
θL =
¯ˆ
θm+ θˆ∗v
m+ v
, (2.8)
which reflects the combined influence of social information (
¯ˆ
θ) and the prior
(θˆ∗). We confirm in supplementary material, §1.1 that such social learning does
not support CCE, because it cannot improve average trait efficiency over time
when combined with individual learning.
Each sample comes at some cost, k ≥ 0, which represents the expenditure
and risk involved in surveilling others. Collecting additional samples allows
learners to more faithfully reproduce the average trait, but comes at a higher
overall cost, kmx. The average low-fidelity social learner’s fitness is thus
ω¯L = ω0 + z¯L − kmx. (2.9)
As in individual learning, sampling yields diminishing returns. The optimal
social learning rate is
m =
√√√√ v
kx
x∑
i=1
∣∣∣ ¯ˆθi − θˆ∗i ∣∣∣− v, (2.10)
though such learning should be avoided entirely, m = 0, if others haven’t im-
proved on the initial trait, z¯ ≤ z∗. More effort is devoted to learning when doing
so is inexpensive (low k) and there is more knowledge to acquire (the summed
term is large).
Combining equations (2.3), (2.8) and (2.10) gives the average low-fidelity
social learner’s trait efficiency,
z¯L = z¯ −
√√√√kvx x∑
i=1
∣∣∣ ¯ˆθi − θˆ∗i ∣∣∣. (2.11)
Such learning cannot reliably preserve others’ knowledge, z¯L = z¯, unless learning
is free (k = 0) or there is nothing to learn (the summed term is 0). Otherwise,
some knowledge is lost in transmission and supplanted by prior beliefs [25].
2.3 High-fidelity social learning
High-fidelity social learning involves faithfully reproducing an existing trait,
which we formalize as copying another individual’s estimates. One way this
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could happen is if a learner adopts identical underlying beliefs [25]. For exam-
ple, language or gesture could convey everything a teacher knows about where
to aim blows when knapping. Alternatively, a learner could adopt beliefs that
are merely compatible with the observed trait (i.e. different distributions with
the same posterior mode). For instance, accurately imitating a demonstrator’s
construction process could yield spears of the same average length, but subtly
different beliefs about the relative efficiency of shorter or longer ones. In either
case, the average high-fidelity social learner’s estimate is identical to that of
the population,
¯ˆ
θH =
¯ˆ
θ, as is its trait efficiency, z¯H = z¯. We confirm in sup-
plementary material, §1.2 that such social learning supports CCE, because it
can improve average trait efficiency over time when combined with individual
learning.
Each parameter individuals copy comes at some cost. Thus far, we have
assumed that social and individual learning rely on the same cognitive mech-
anisms [31] and that the evolution of social learning primarily reflects changes
in attention and motivation. However, high-fidelity transmission may involve
more specialized and cognitively demanding forms of social learning [16, 2, 17].
For example, if it involves accurate imitation, then it may require specialized
neural machinery for parsing and reproducing bodily actions that has under-
gone significant elaboration in the hominin lineage [32, 12]. Alternatively, if it
involves human-like teaching, then it may require the capacity for gesture or
even language [33]. Though some researchers argue that high-fidelity transmis-
sion is as much a product of cultural as of biological evolution [34], some genetic
endowment is clearly needed, even if this consists of a mere ‘start-up kit’ that
is later refined through culture [35].
That being said, the addition of brain tissue is notoriously energetically
expensive, particularly during development [36]. The cost of high-fidelity social
learning may thus consist of two components: a dynamic component, gd, that
reflects the expenditure and risk involved in employing such learning; and a
static component, gs, that reflects the cost of developing and maintaining it.
This gives an overall cost gdx+ gs ≥ 0, where the dynamic cost grows with how
extensively learning is employed (x), but the static cost is invariant. To capture
both components as a single per-parameter cost, we define g = gd + gs/x. The
average high-fidelity social learner’s fitness is thus
ω¯H = ω0 + z¯ − gx. (2.12)
3 Results
To contrast the evolution of high- and low-fidelity social learning, we track the
fate of rare social learning mutants in a monomorphic population of individ-
ual learners, where z¯ = z¯I and ω¯ = ω¯I. Social learning goes extinct if these
mutants’ average fitness (ω¯L or ω¯H) falls below that of the resident type (ω¯I).
Conversely, social learning evolves if these mutants have higher fitness and their
invasion results in either fixation or coexistence (a dimorphic equilibrium). We
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do not consider dimorphic resident populations, because for our purposes the
effects would be fairly straightforward. Namely, the resident population’s av-
erage trait efficiency (z¯) would decrease as low-fidelity social learning became
more common, which is equivalent to a monomorphic case where high-fidelity
transmission is more costly (i.e. g is ∆z¯/x higher).
While social learning is often subject to frequency-dependent selection [37],
this does not concern us for two reasons. First, high-fidelity social learning’s
fitness is not frequency-dependent at all, because it simply maintains the popula-
tion’s average trait (z¯H = z¯) and this trait’s efficiency does not change over time
(cf. [37]). Any fitness advantage it has as a rare mutant thus persists until fixa-
tion. Second, while low-fidelity social learning’s fitness is frequency-dependent,
this never brings about its extinction. Rather, as such mutants become more
common, their average trait efficiency declines until their fitness equalizes with
that of the resident type, ω¯L = ω¯I, resulting in a dimorphic equilibrium. We
show in supplementary material, §2 that such an equilibrium exists and is stable
whenever they invade.
Social learning cost is central to our analysis, because it reveals both when
a given type of learning could conceivably pay for itself and when it is best
equipped to do so. Setting ω¯L = ω¯I gives the maximum per-sample cost of
low-fidelity social learning,
kmax =
(√
cv −√f) (2√f −√cfv +√cv − 2√f)
v
, (3.1)
and setting ω¯H = ω¯I gives the maximum per-parameter cost of high-fidelity
social learning,
gmax =
√
cfv − cv. (3.2)
At or above these values, such learning no longer confers a fitness advantage.
Identifying when kmax > 0 or gmax > 0 thus reveals the minimum requirements
for social learning to evolve. More importantly, conditions that maximize kmax
or gmax reveal when such learning withstands the broadest possible range of
costs and is thus most likely to evolve (though such conditions do not necessarily
maximize its prevalence in the population, learning rate, etc.).
3.1 Social learning cost (k and g)
For social learning to evolve, it must either improve on the average trait or
reduce the cost of acquiring it [38]. Although transmission errors can yield a
superior trait, lucky mistakes are no more likely to be observed than unlucky
ones (cf. [30]). Therefore, social learning must reduce cost. Setting ω¯L > ω¯I
reveals that low-fidelity social learning evolves when its savings in cost exceed
its average loss in trait efficiency
cnx− kmx > z¯I − z¯L. (3.3)
The more errors in transmission, the larger the necessary savings. By contrast,
high-fidelity social learning makes virtually no errors in transmission. It thus
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evolves (ω¯H > ω¯I) when it offers nearly any savings in cost
cnx− gx > 0. (3.4)
(In reality, there will likely always be some slight, non-zero level of error to
overcome.) Taken together, equations (3.3) and (3.4) imply that high-fidelity
social learning tolerates a greater overall cost by maintaining more efficient
traits.
3.2 Trait complexity (x)
Trait complexity can be eliminated from equation (3.3), because each term grows
linearly with x. Doing so yields the equivalent expression cn− km > ∣∣ ¯ˆθI − ¯ˆθL∣∣,
which implies that low-fidelity social learning is as likely to evolve when traits
are simple as when they are complex. The same is not true of equation (3.4),
once we break cost g down into its static and dynamic components. Instead,
the evolution of high-fidelity social learning requires crossing a threshold in trait
complexity, x > gs/(cn− gd), which increases with the cost of both having (gs)
and employing (gd) such learning.
Note that this result is not contingent on our assumption that trait efficiency
and learning cost grow linearly with respect to trait complexity, but rather that
they grow at the same rate. For example, x could still be eliminated from
equation (3.3) if efficiency and cost both grew logarithmically (e.g. if increased
complexity yielded diminishing returns in efficiency, but learning one parameter
made it easier to learn others).
3.3 Individual learning rate (n)
Social learning can only evolve (kmax > 0 or gmax > 0) when there is knowledge
to acquire, n > 0. However, different types of social learning benefit from vastly
different individual learning rates (figure 1a). This can be seen by finding the
values of n that maximize kmax and gmax (after first simplifying these expressions
by using equation (2.6) to substitute c = fv/(n + v)2). Doing so reveals that
low-fidelity social learning is most likely to evolve when the individual learning
rate is low, n = v/3, and beliefs are driven mostly by prior expectations. By
contrast, high-fidelity transmission is most likely to evolve when the individual
learning rate is much higher, n = v.
3.4 Individual learning cost (c)
Social learning cannot evolve when individual learning is free, c = 0, because it
confers no savings. Similarly, it cannot evolve when individual learning is too
expensive to engage in, c ≥ f/v, because there is nothing to learn. Between these
two extremes, however, different individual learning costs favour different types
of social learning (figure 1b). Low-fidelity transmission is most likely to evolve
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Figure 1: Resilience of high- and low-fidelity social learning as a function of: (a)
the individual learning rate, (b) individual learning cost, (c) problem difficulty
and (d) conservatism. Dotted lines indicate when social learning is most likely
to evolve. High-fidelity transmission evolves when individual learning is com-
paratively (a) plentiful and (b) inexpensive. Its evolution may also depend on
confronting particularly (c) challenging adaptive problems, because it accrues
the benefits of increased problem difficulty more slowly. Finally, while all so-
cial learning benefits from (d) behavioural flexibility, high-fidelity transmission
could benefit from higher levels of conservatism if these stimulate rather than
depress individual learning. Parameters: c = 0.005, f = 0.5, v = 12.
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when individual learning is relatively expensive, c = 9f/(16v), whereas high-
fidelity transmission benefits from much cheaper individual learning, c = f/(4v).
In fact, the latter regime represents a 5/9 ≈ 56% reduction in cost.
3.5 Problem difficulty (f)
Adaptive problems must be sufficiently difficult, f > cv, for learning to evolve.
Below this threshold, learning is not cost-effective, because the optimal trait
is highly intuitive. Harder problems favour social learning in particular, which
becomes more resilient as difficulty increases: ∂kmax/∂f > 0 and ∂gmax/∂f > 0.
Social learning is thus most likely to evolve when problems are as difficult as
possible, f = 1. That being said, high- and low-fidelity transmission react
differently to increases in difficulty (figure 1c). Normalizing kmax and gmax
by their maximum values reveals that kmax/ kmax|f=1 > gmax/ gmax|f=1 over
cv < f < 1. In other words, low-fidelity transmission accrues the benefits of
increased problem difficulty sooner. Larger increases are thus needed for high-
fidelity transmission to reap comparable rewards (i.e. a proportional increase
in resilience against cost).
3.6 Conservatism (v)
Learning can only evolve when the level of conservatism falls below v < f/c.
Stronger priors make learning uneconomical, because updating beliefs involves
collecting too much data. Low-fidelity transmission always benefits from re-
duced conservatism, ∂kmax/∂v < 0, and is thus most likely to evolve when pri-
ors are as diffuse as possible (low v). Although high-fidelity transmission also
benefits from behavioural flexibility (figure 1d), its ideal level of conservatism
is somewhat higher, v = f/(4c). This value is ideal because it maximizes the
individual learning rate.
4 Discussion
A longstanding question about CCE is why humans acquired this capacity,
which appears diminished or absent in other species. Given the importance of
transmission fidelity [9], one explanation is that CCE relies on powerful but spe-
cialized forms of social learning at which humans are uniquely adept [16, 2, 17].
By characterizing social learning in terms of its ability to support CCE rather
than specific underlying mechanisms, we find that high-fidelity transmission
evolves under different conditions than less accurate social learning. Specifi-
cally, high-fidelity transmission is most likely to evolve when: (1) social and
(2) individual learning are inexpensive, (3) traits are complex, (4) individual
learning rates and (5) problem difficulty are high, and (6) behaviour is flexible.
Low-fidelity transmission differs in many respects. Not only is it most likely to
evolve when individual learning is (2) costly and (4) infrequent, but it is also
more robust when (3) traits are simple and (5) problems are easy. If conditions
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favouring the evolution of high-fidelity transmission are stricter (3 and 5) or
harder to meet (2 and 4), this could explain why social learning is common
across species, but CCE is rare.
Comparative analyses suggest that reliance on social learning covaries with
brain size in primates [39, 40]. Because the hominin brain has undergone sev-
eral large evolutionary expansions [41], high-fidelity social learning may require
the addition of costly brain tissue [16]. Our model suggests that one way to
compensate for this increased expenditure would be to lower other costs associ-
ated with social learning. This could be achieved in several ways. First, social
tolerance and grouping could provide easier, safer and more frequent opportu-
nities to learn from others. In support of this view, sociability has been found
to covary with reliance on social learning both within humans [42] and across
primates [39]. Second, extended juvenile periods could free up time for social
learning [43] without forgoing the opportunities in reproduction and resource
acquisition available to an adult. Third, proactive prosociality could promote
teaching [44]. Teaching, in this case, does not necessarily refer to the varied and
cognitively complex forms it takes in humans [15, 33], but rather to any instance
where individuals modify their behaviour to foster others’ learning [44]. Peda-
gogy could thus drive its own evolution, with more elaborate forms of teaching
evolving in response to this reduction in cost.
Another way to offset the added cost of high-fidelity transmission would be
through higher intake [36]. In line with previous models, we find that accu-
rate social learning tolerates a greater overall cost precisely because it yields
more efficient traits [16]. We build on this insight by allowing trait efficiency
to grow with trait complexity. Though this relationship is not universal (e.g.
simplifying a trait could make it more efficient), complexity is often indicative of
improvement. For example, as knapping techniques became more elaborate and
hierarchically structured, this resulted in better tools [45]. Following this as-
sumption, we find that high-fidelity social learning is more likely to evolve when
traits are complex, because the payoffs in trait efficiency dwarf the cost of devel-
oping and maintaining such learning. Unlike other species, early hominins may
have crossed a threshold in trait complexity that allowed accurate transmission
to evolve. This initial complexity may have arisen for reasons other than social
learning, for example because encephalization allowed for more sophisticated
action sequences [3].
This explanation is consistent with the archaeological record. Stout and
Hecht [32] note that the first stone tools (3.3 Ma) saw only intermittent use
and that even the early Oldowan technocomplex (2.6–2.0 Ma) gives the impres-
sion of being at the limits of hominin ability. Though the existence of local
traditions suggests that Oldowan techniques were culturally transmitted [45],
there is a conspicuous lack of evidence for CCE until much later on [46], fol-
lowing significant increases in brain size [41]. During this early period (and
perhaps considerably beyond it [47]), social learning seems to have spread and
maintained but not significantly refined the manufacture of tools. Not only is
there no clear evidence of high-fidelity transmission [46] but the observed cul-
tural dynamics closely align with those found in our model when individual
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and low-fidelity social learning are combined (supplementary material, §1.1).
Namely, a steady state emerges where average trait efficiency remains stable,
but knowledge is repeatedly lost and rediscovered (socially mediated serial rein-
novation [48]). In short, rather than high-fidelity social learning spreading and
maintaining early lithic technologies, their relative complexity may have instead
facilitated its evolution.
The putatively high cost of accurate transmission is only one of the potential
impediments to its evolution. Theory suggests that low individual learning rates
could also play a role [38]. In line with this view, we find that much higher rates
may be needed for the evolution of high- rather than low-fidelity social learning.
Notably, the hominin lineage is characterized by large brains and high general
intelligence, both of which are predictive of innovation rates in primates [39].
If few species are sufficiently prolific individual learners, this could explain why
accurate transmission is rare.
Of course, this raises the question of how adequate individual learning rates
could be achieved in the first place. The most obvious way to stimulate individ-
ual learning is to reduce its cost. Previous theory [1] and experiments [42] warn
that doing so can undercut social learning, however. While we find support for
this view, we also find that high-fidelity transmission nevertheless benefits from
such reductions. In practice, many of the same factors that mitigate the cost of
social learning could do so for individual learning as well. First, grouping could
reduce the cost of exploration by allowing individuals to diffuse the associated
risks [49]. Second, extended juvenile periods could offer more time for not just
social learning, but individual learning as well [43]. Costs borne by juveniles
in protected environments, where others provide food, shelter and predator de-
tection [43], would be especially affected. Finally, even teaching could play a
role in the form of opportunity scaffolding, where a teacher does not necessar-
ily demonstrate a behaviour, but rather furnishes students with easy and safe
opportunities to learn on their own [50].
Another way to promote individual learning is by facing more challenging
adaptive problems. We find that the evolution of high-fidelity social learning
may involve confronting particularly difficult social, ecological and technologi-
cal challenges (i.e. problems where optimal traits fall far outside the ‘zone of
latent solutions’ [17]). There are several reasons to think that hominins con-
fronted such problems. First, because bipedalism allows hominins to cover far
larger geographical ranges than other primates, with lifetime home ranges sev-
eral orders of magnitude greater than those of chimpanzees [51], individuals were
likely subjected to greater variability in environmental conditions, available re-
sources, potential threats, etc. If behaviour that is adaptive in one setting is
non-adaptive in others, then problems may more frequently require unintuitive
solutions. Second, an exceptionally large proportion of the hominin diet consists
of high-quality foods [52], such as those procured through hunting, extractive
foraging and confrontational scavenging [36]. Compared to foods consumed
more regularly by other primates, these are skill intensive and difficult to ob-
tain [52]. Finally, new ways of thinking, interacting with others and leveraging
technology undoubtedly presented novel problems of their own. This probably
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resulted in a unique and challenging cognitive, cultural and technological niche,
which further shaped the course of our evolution [32].
Lastly, it is worth commenting on the role of conservatism. A striking em-
pirical finding is that chimpanzees suffer from remarkable functional fixedness
and behavioural conservatism, which are thought to contribute to the paucity
of CCE in this species [5, 6]. We find that conservatism impedes CCE inso-
far as it disfavours investment into social learning. However, we also find that
high-fidelity social learning could benefit from higher levels of conservatism if
these stimulate rather than depress individual learning. For conservatism to
impede the evolution of accurate transmission in particular, some additional
assumption must be invoked, namely that such transmission also happens to be
comparatively expensive.
Individually, our criteria for evolving improved fidelity of transmission seem
simple: mitigating the cost of learning, confronting harder adaptive problems,
acquiring more complex traits, etc. However, our model emphasizes that meet-
ing any one of these criteria is not necessarily sufficient. For example, even
if migration exposes individuals to less intuitive problems, learning could still
be too expensive. Similarly, even if grouping lowers the cost of learning, traits
could still be too simple. In short, humans probably evolved high-fidelity social
learning not by meeting any one (or more) of these criteria perfectly, but by
meeting all of them well enough.
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